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ABSTRACT
This jointly authored Article scaffolds our respective research interests that
analyze laws, rules, regulations, and policy levers that may inhibit—or ex-
ploit—a market’s ability to recognize an asset’s intrinsic value, whether in
terms of social, human, or financial capital.
In particular, this Article describes recent material changes to the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules promulgated in 2013 that Congress
authorized by passing 2012’s JOBS Act. Contrary to statutory timing, the SEC
has delayed the implementation of these new rules that impact the ability of
small and entrepreneurial businesses to attract equity capital financing via In-
ternet platforms. By applying the Court’s historical tests for public equity of-
ferings to the new regulatory regime, this Article analyzes what types of
equity-securities offerings ought to be permitted under the new regulatory re-
gime. This Article, however, also illustrates numerous material shortcomings
of the JOBS Act and articulates the reasons underpinning those shortcomings
and how they affect the U.S. economy, entrepreneurship, and job creation,
thus undermining much of the purpose of the JOBS Act.
To address these deficiencies, this Article suggests several proscriptive
amendments to the JOBS Act that not only would enhance equity crowdfund-
ing for small businesses and entrepreneurs, leading to job growth in the U.S.,
but also preserve investor protection. This Article concludes that the current
regulatory regime may very well fail not only to create jobs by crowdfunded
equity financing of new businesses sought by the JOBS Act but also eliminate
the jobs of the traditional equity financers—investment banks—thereby lead-
ing to a potential equity capital crunch and a reduction, rather than an in-
crease, in employment relative to equity financing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Every business begins somewhere, sometimes from an idea that
sprouted in an entrepreneurial dreamer’s mind, and sometimes, post-
bankruptcy closing, from some other beginning’s end.1 The bounda-
ries of what newly formed businesses may achieve in terms of opera-
tion and growth remain nearly as limitless as the human imagination
and the laws, rules, and regulations that prohibit that imagination
from becoming reality. However, additional barriers exist to each bus-
iness’s formation or operation, from obtaining formation capital, to
property, plant, or equipment.2
Historically, the material methods that entrepreneurs employed to
obtain start-up capital are through equity investment, debt, or a com-
bination of both. Financial capital is not cheap.3 To obtain an accurate
calculation of the cost of capital, entrepreneurs typically need to hire
1. SEMISONIC, Closing Time, on FEELING STRANGELY FINE (MCA Records
1998).
2. See Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Bar-
rier?, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 58 (1998).
3. See John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance Market: A
Proposal to Expand the Intermediary Role of Finders in the Private Capital Raising
Setting, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 861, 869 (2005).
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an accountant to calculate that cost, measured by the weighted aver-
age cost of capital.4
Entrepreneurs have faced the difficulty of obtaining capital for a
long time. However, with the advent of the World Wide Web and ex-
ponential use of the Internet, the world is much more interconnected
than the world was in the 1930s. The ability to access information and
communicate with one another is unlimited. Before the Internet’s in-
vention, if an organization wanted to raise money for donations to
support a charity, that organization would have to seek those dona-
tions by means of face-to-face communications, solicitations through
mail, or advertisements via television or print media. Face-to-face
communications are effective and inexpensive, but do not reach very
many people.5 Solicitations through U.S. mail reach many people, but
are ineffective because few people read impersonal correspondence
received via U.S. mail.6 Advertisements reach many people but are
expensive and are only effective if the advertisement includes Sarah
McLachlan singing about puppies and kittens.7
With the Internet, that same organization can reach millions of peo-
ple, with lower costs, and be effective at the same time. Recently,
4. The Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) measures the expected cost
for the company’s various obligations including debt, preferred stock, and common
stock. WACC is an important tool for the company in determining whether a pro-
posed project by the company will be profitable. As long as the WACC of a project is
less than the expected returns of the project, discounted to the present, the project
will provide a return to the company. Such projects will increase the company’s free
cash flow and should increase the intrinsic value of the company’s stock and subse-
quent market price. Using external capital to fund company projects and investments
rather than internal free cash flows that result from returns that exceed WACC be-
cause the company must either pay interest or dividends on the outside capital. Such
frictional costs do not exist in preferred equity financing since preferred stock is gen-
erally sold from corporation to corporation. But if the company sells preferred stock
or debt instruments such as bonds via an underwriter, these friction costs still exist.
See generally EUGENE F. BRIGHAM & JOEL F. HOUSTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF FINAN-
CIAL MANAGEMENT 337 (13th ed. 2012).
For a further humorous explanation of WACC, see Amarathe, Baby Got WACC,
YOUTUBE (Apr. 20, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JluzYxAexvg.
5. Judy Lightfoot, In-Your-Face Solicitations on Downtown Streets, CROSSCUT
.COM (Aug. 11, 2011), http://crosscut.com/2011/08/11/business/21193/Inyourface-solici
tations-on-downtown-streets/.
6. To improve the effectiveness of U.S. mail solicitations, it is recommended that
one compile a mailing list that singles out responders. See generally Jerry Mamola,
Mailing Lists 101: What Every Media Buyer Needs to Know, http://www.listsformarket
ing.com (last visited Dec 18. 2013); see also Digital Direct, Seven Steps to Effective
Direct Mail, http://www.msp-pgh.com/files/7-Steps-to-Effective-Direct-Mail.pdf (last
visited Dec. 18, 2013).
7. See Stephanie Strom, Ad Featuring Singer Proves Bonanza for A.S.P.C.A,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/26/us/26charity.html?_r
=0; Sarah McLachlan SPCA Commercial, YOUTUBE (Nov. 26, 2008), http://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=IO9d2PpP7tQ; The Most Effective Fundraising Channels for Solic-
iting Donations, REDBIRD (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.redbirdonline.com/blog/most-
effective-fundraising-channels-soliciting-donations.
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theCHIVE.com8 attempted to raise money to support the Stein family
of Missouri, the family of a sick child who needed custom additions
and renovations to the family’s house to accommodate the child’s dis-
abilities.9 TheCHIVE.com created a funding portal on gofundme.com
where altruistic individuals could donate however much money they
chose to provide to the Stein family to help obtain the much needed
renovations.10 TheCHIVE.com’s goal was to raise $30,000.11 Within
three days and as of May 7, 2013, supporters had donated over
$160,000.12
TheCHIVE.com’s ability to raise capital is a microcosmal example
of the kind of capital that foundations and/or business enterprises can
raise via the Internet. The supporters of the Stein family received
nothing in return for their contributions; their only motivating factors
were goodwill and the desire to help a family in need. Imagine how
much money could be raised if, instead of getting nothing in return,
supporters could receive some kind of tangible or measurable benefit
in return?
Other illustrations include the projects funded on websites such as
kickstarter.com. On kickstarter.com, individuals can fund projects
such as documentaries, televisions shows, and even major motion pic-
tures.13 In exchange and in return for their money supporting the film
or project, the supporter receives incentives such as memorabilia,
screenings, invitations to parties with cast members, and copies of the
sound track.14 Supporters essentially purchase consumable goods or
services, or both, in the form of perquisites related to the project.
When the costs of these perquisites are less than their corresponding
sale price, the excess or residual goes to fund the project. The most
recent kickstarter.com campaign to hit the headlines was the funding
of a Veronica Mars movie in which the campaign raised over $5.7 mil-
lion.15 One might imagine how much money could be raised if, instead
of receiving soundtracks and advanced screening tickets, these sup-
porters could be guaranteed a recoupment of their donation or invest-
ment plus a reasonable rate of return.
The foregoing atmosphere reflects crowdfunding. Congress broadly
defined crowdfunding in the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of
8. This website is self-proclaimed as “probably the best website in the world.”
9. John Resig, An Unbelievable Griffin Stein Update, THECHIVE.COM (May 3,
2013), http://thechive.com/2013/05/03/an-unbelievable-griffin-stein-update/.
10. GOFUNDME, http://www.gofundme.com/2pb2cg (last visited May 16, 2013).
11. Resig, supra note 9.
12. Id.
13. KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/start (last visited May 16, 2013).
14. Zach Braff, Wish I was Here, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/
projects/1869987317/wish-i-was-here-1 (last visited May 16, 2013).
15. Rob Thomas, The Veronica Mars Movie Project, KICKSTARTER, http://www
.kickstarter.com/projects/559914737/the-veronica-mars-movie-project (last visited
May 16, 2013).
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2012 (JOBS Act) as “Capital Raising Online.”16 Tanya Prive of Forbes
Magazine defined crowdfunding as “the practice of funding a project
or venture by raising many small amounts of money from a large num-
ber of people, typically via the Internet.”17 Crowdfunding potentially
helps solve problems of difficulty of obtaining capital and the associ-
ated cost of obtaining that capital that an entrepreneur faces. Raising
capital online so far appears to be relatively simple, effective, inexpen-
sive, and capable of reaching millions of potential investors.18
Crowdfunding as a means of obtaining capital really is nontraditional,
since that method appears to represent a manner of raising capital
that is better suited to the current era than traditional equity and debt
investment mechanisms.19
A problem exists, however, if an entrepreneur raised capital online
in exchange for equity ownership of the startup; then that entrepre-
neur may have issued securities subject to regulation under the 1933
Act and would face civil penalties for not complying with federal se-
curities laws, rules, and regulations.20 To facilitate equity crowdfund-
ing and avoid some of the hardships of the federal securities laws,
Congress, in 2012, passed the JOBS Act.21 However, Congress may
have created more problems for entrepreneurs and potential investors
than Congress solved with the JOBS Act. As a result, this essay will
highlight some of the shortcomings of the JOBS Act and provide al-
ternative solutions that, if implemented, could eliminate traditional in-
vestment banks’ essential role as part of the initial public offering
(IPO) dealmaking process.
Part II discusses the difficulties facing startups in obtaining capital.
Part III describes crowdfunding and its brief history. Part IV analyzes
whether equity crowdfunding creates a security that falls within the
scope of the federal securities laws, rules, and regulations. Since this
Article concludes that equity crowdfunding falls within the scope of
the federal securities laws, rules, and regulations, Part V discusses
what compliance with federal securities laws, rules, and regulations
16. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-116,
§ 301, 126 Stat. 306 (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr360
6enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr3606enr.pdf.
17. Tanya Prive, What Is Crowdfunding and How Does It Benefit the Economy,
FORBES (Nov. 27, 2012, 10:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/11/
27/what-is-crowdfunding-and-how-does-it-benefit-the-economy/.
18. Jenna Wortham, Success of Crowdfunding Puts Pressure on Entrepreneurs,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/
technology/success-of-crowdfunding-puts-pressure-on-
entrepreneurs.html?pagewanted=all.
19. See Gary Emmanuel, 5 Reasons Why Equity-Based Crowdfunding Under the
JOBS Act Won’t Work, HUFFPOST BUS. (Feb. 25, 2013, 12:41 PM), http://www.huffing
tonpost.com/gary-emmanuel/5-reasons-why-equitybased_b_2759580.html.
20. See Prive, supra note 17; C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal
Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 11 (2012).
21. See Prive, supra note 17.
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looks like for crowdfunding and how the JOBS Act has exempted
crowdfunding from certain requirements. Part VI depicts some of the
shortcomings of the JOBS Act, and Part VII provides alternatives to
the JOBS Act that may overcome the JOBS Act’s shortcomings. This
Article concludes that through an effective implementation of
crowdfunding, funding portals could replace underwriters in offering
securities to the public, causing underwriters to lose their jobs to fund-
ing portals.
II. DIFFICULTIES OBTAINING CAPITAL
A. Debt financing
1. Cost of Debt
Obtaining capital through debt is not an easy task for the entrepre-
neur.22 Nevertheless, loans are the primary source of capital for small
businesses.23 The primary sources of business loans are commercial
lending institutions or banks.24 A lender generally operates with the
predominant purpose of making money for the lender’s sharehold-
ers.25 Lenders require borrowers to pay the lenders for the opportu-
nity to borrow capital. When a lender lends capital to the
entrepreneur, the entrepreneur is essentially renting the money from
the bank, and the bank requires that the entrepreneur pay rent in the
form of interest on the loan.26 Interest rates vary depending on a cal-
culation of various market and risk factors.27 Generally, the interest
rate a bank gives to an entrepreneur will be high due to the risk asso-
22. William Alden, Small Businesses Still Having Trouble Getting Loans,
HUFFPOST BUS. (May 25, 2011, 7:30 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/09/
small-business-loans_n_820675.html.
23. Fisch, supra note 2, at 60.
24. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services
Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L.
REV. 215, 222 (2002) (discussing the homogenization and consolidation of United
States banks).
25. Id. at 288.
26. Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Ser-
vices Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking
About the Role of Usury Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 603 (2000).
27. The interest rate (k) that a business gets is typically the sum of the interest rate
of the corresponding risk free security (rf) (generally the rate of the treasury bond
that has the same life as the debt obligation), an inflation premium (ip) (generally
calculated by the average of the current inflation rate and the expected inflation rate
for the life of the debt), a liquidity premium (lp) (a premium that represents the risk
of making an illiquid asset), a maturity risk premium (mrp) (a premium that compen-
sates the lender for the risk that the loan will not mature upon the ending of the life of
the loan), and a default risk premium (drp) (determined by the borrower’s credit
rating) (k=rf+ip+lp+mrp+drp). See generally BRIGHAM & HOUSTON, supra note 4, at
189–94; but see Jennifer F. Bender, The Average Interest Rate for Small Business
Loans, CHRON.COM (2013), http://smallbusiness.chron.com/average-interest-rate-
small-business-loans-15342.html.
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ciated with a brand new business organization.28 The cost of debt fi-
nancing can therefore be formidable. The only saving grace is that
interest payments are often deductible from federal income taxes.29
2. Finding a Willing Lender
Not only is debt expensive, finding a lender willing to issue a loan or
extend a revolving line of credit is not easy.30 Especially right now
with interest rates as low as they are, banks have become less likely to
loan money.31 Typically, lenders are only willing to extend credit or
issue a loan if the debtor has property that the debtor can use to se-
cure the obligation as collateral.32 The entrepreneur secures the obli-
gation by granting the lender a security interest in the business’s
personal or real property, or both, as collateral.33 If the entrepreneur
conducts business as a sole proprietor and grants a security interest in
the business’s property, then the entrepreneur essentially grants a se-
curity interest in the entrepreneur’s own property, since the sole pro-
prietor invests personal assets into the startup.34 Once the obligation
is secured, if the entrepreneur defaults on the obligation, the lender
can foreclose on, or take possession of, that collateral.35 Being subject
to the loss of one’s property is another risk that the entrepreneur
faces.
B. Equity Financing
1. Cost of Equity
Instead of choosing to employ debt financing, the entrepreneur can
obtain capital from investors who, in exchange for their investment in
the startup, take an equity or ownership interest in the startup.36 Ob-
taining equity financing, just like debt financing, is not easy.37 Inves-
28. Small Business Rate Report, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 17, 2013),
http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/resources/rate_report/sb_rate_report.htm.
29. See generally 26 U.S.C. §§ 161–163 (2012) (federal tax code provisions al-
lowing deductions for ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in carrying on
a trade or business and interest payments on loans).
30. Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 228.
31. See generally Alden, supra note 22; Small Business Rate Report, supra note 28.
32. See Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 230; SBA.GOV, http://www.sba.gov/content/
collateral (last visited May 16, 2013).
33. U.C.C. § 9-203 (1998) (stating the requirements to grant a security interest in
personal property).
34. Mitchell F. Crusto, Unconscious Classism: Entity Equality for Sole Proprietors,
11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 215, 227 (2009).
35. U.C.C. § 9-601(a)(1) (1998) (establishing the rights of a creditor when a debtor
defaults on the obligation including the right to peaceably repossess the collateral as a
form of foreclosure).
36. For purposes of this Article, the term startup refers to a fledgling business
enterprise.
37. Jeffrey A. Brill, “Testing the Waters”—The SEC’s Feet Go from Wet to Cold,
83 CORNELL L. REV. 464, 467 (1998).
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tors require a return on their investment.38 Generally, the cost of
venture capital (VC) is high.39 Nevertheless, the high cost of VC does
not account for the managerial benefits that experienced VCists
provide.40
Two common ways of measuring the return that investors require
are Net Present Value (NPV) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR).41
Investors use NPV to determine the profitability of any business pro-
ject.42 NPV is the difference between the present value of expected
cash inflows and the present value of estimated cash outflows.43 Such
an analysis depends on a reliability of future cash flows that a business
will yield.44 In the case of a startup, such future cash flows may be
difficult to predict, thus increasing the risk of the startup.45 To offset
and compensate for that risk, investors require a higher rate of return
on their investment.46
IRR is the discount rate that makes the NPV of all cash flows equal
zero.47 The higher a business’s NPV, the higher the discount rate re-
quired to zero out NPV.48 Therefore, when a startup has a high IRR,
the startup attracts more investment.49 Investors use IRR to rank po-
tential ventures in order of prospective profitability.50
38. Sophie Manigart et al., Determinants of Required Return in Venture Capital
Investments: A Five-Country Study, 17 J. OF BUS. VENTURING 291 (2002) (discussing
the return required by over 200 venture capital firms).
39. Fisch, supra note 2, at 62.
40. Id.
41. Carlton L. Dudley, Jr., A Note on Reinvestment Assumptions in Choosing Be-
tween Net Present Value and Internal Rate of Return, 27 J. FIN. 907 (1972) (discussing
differences between NPV and IRR).
42. Evaluating Cash Flows: NPV and IRR, COLUMBIA.EDU, http://ci.columbia.edu/
ci/premba_test/c0332/s5/s5_5.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2013).
43. Id.; see also Ronald E. Shrieves & John M. Wachowicz, Free Cash Flow (FCF),
Economic Value Added (EVA), and Net Present Value (NPV): A Reconciliation of
Variations of Discounted-Cash-Flow (DCF) Valuation, 46 ENGINEERING ECONOMIST
33, 35 (2001).
44. Dudley, supra note 41.
45. In the case of a startup, there is often a lack of data establishing a pattern or a
trend that would assist in forecasting future cash flows.
46. Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporate Fi-
nance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 262 (1958).
47. See id.
48. NPV is the preferred method of analysis of capital budgeting as NPV better
represents expected shareholder value. The problem with IRR is that it assumes that
a project will not produce any interim or intermediate cash flows, or if there are such
cash flows, that those cash flows will be reinvested at the same IRR. If a project has a
positive NPV, IRR will underestimate the return. If a project has a negative NPV,
which is the more likely case, IRR will overestimate returns and cause investors to
lose money. See generally John C. Kelleher & Justin J. MacCormack, Internal Rate of
Return: A Cautionary Tale, MCKINSEY Q. (2005); Patricia A. Ryan & Glen P. Ryan,
Capital Budgeting Practices of the Fortune 1000: How Have Things Changed?, 8 J.
BUS. & MGT. 4 (Winter 2002); Dudley, supra note 41.
49. BRIGHAM & HOUSTON, supra note 4, at 373–76.
50. Id.
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Compliance with the federal securities laws, rules, and regulations
also attributes to the cost of equity investment. Once the entrepreneur
obtains equity investment, the entrepreneur ceases to be sole proprie-
tor. When an equity investor becomes a part owner of the startup that
is not registered or organized under the laws of a jurisdiction, relevant
jurisdictional partnership laws state that the owners formed a partner-
ship.51 If the startup registers under the laws of its respective jurisdic-
tion, the owners may choose to form a myriad of business
organizations, including a limited liability company, a closely held cor-
poration, or if the state has adopted a newer business entity under the
guise of social enterprise legislation, a socially beneficial entity type
such as a flexible purpose corporation, limited liability low-profit com-
pany, or certified benefit corporation.52 Nevertheless, the entrepre-
neur would be wise to organize and register with the state to obtain a
liability shield to protect the entrepreneur’s personal assets.53
When registration occurs, or when the entrepreneur takes on equity
investment, the entrepreneur leaves the world of state blue sky laws
and enters the world of federal securities regulation. As discussed in
Part III below, the ownership interest that an investor takes in a star-
tup is a security.54 The investor, any broker-dealer intermediary, and
the startup must then take into account and comply with the federal
laws, rules, and regulations that apply to securities, namely the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder.55 In addition to the laws,
rules, and regulations of the 1933 Act and 1934 Act,56 securities are
subject to the various acts that Congress enacted since the 1930s such
as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Dodd-Frank Act, and JOBS Act.57 If in-
vestors, broker-dealers,58 and startups, including the startups’ direc-
tors, officers, and employees, do not comply with, or violate these
laws, rules, and regulations, investors, broker-dealers, and startups
51. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101(6) (1997).
52. See generally D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS, BUSINESS ORGA-
NIZATIONS, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND CASE STUDIES (3d. ed. 2012); David A. Groshoff,
Con-trapreneurship? Examining Social Enterprise Legislation’s Feel-Good Govern-
ance Giveaways, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. J. (forthcoming 2014).
53. SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 52, at 115, 221.
54. See generally 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012); 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b
(2012).
55. See generally 1933 Act; 1934 Act.
56. 1933 Act; 1934 Act.
57. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Public Company Accounting Reform and Inves-
tor Protection Act), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of U.S.C. titles 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. titles 7, 12, 15, and 31).
58. Broker-dealers are defined by the 1933 Act as persons engaged in the business
of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others. 15 U.S.C. § 77a. See
also JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 1019 (6th ed. 2009).
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face potential civil enforcement actions by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) and lawsuits from private plaintiffs.59
Securities law compliance has become even more difficult and
therefore costly in the last eleven years with the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.60 Capi-
tal market participants still do not know what the Dodd-Frank Act
will bring, as the SEC is still implementing and promulgating rules
under the Dodd-Frank Act.61 The entrepreneur typically is not going
to be familiar with these securities laws and therefore must often hire
an attorney who specializes in securities regulation to ensure compli-
ance, and such attorneys are rather expensive.62
2. Finding Investors
At some point, a startup requires outside equity financing to fund
its operations.63 A well-known source of outside financing is VC fund-
ing.64 Though VC funds provide value to entrepreneurs, VC funds are
not a major source of equity financing in the United States.65 Venture
capital funds typically restrict their investments to startups in “later
stage[s] and larger deals.”66 In addition, VC funds on average require
a return of thirty percent or more, which can be quite expensive to the
firm.67
An earlier potential alternative to VC funding is the use of “angel”
investors.68 Angel investors are diverse wealthy private investors who
invest in startup companies.69 These angel investors collectively con-
stitute the angel market.70 Angels typically invest their own money
unlike VC funds that invest other people’s money.71 The market for
angel investors is inefficient, so finding angel investors can be diffi-
cult.72 The entrepreneur can perform an Internet search to locate such
angel investors, but such a search is not very effective because private
59. COX ET AL., supra note 58.
60. Id. at 9.
61. Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
— Pending Action, SEC.GOV (May 2, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/
dfactivity-upcoming.shtml.
62. See, e.g., Vincent DiCarlo, How Much Will FINRA (formerly known as
NASD) Arbitration Cost?, INVESTORRECOVERY.COM, http://www.investorrecovery
.com/HowMuchWillItCost.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2013).
63. Orcutt, supra note 3, at 865.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 871.
67. Dharmesh Shah, Fatal Distraction: The True Cost of Startup Capital, ONSTAR-
TUPS.COM (Mar. 22, 2006), http://onstartups.com/tabid/3339/bid/196/Fatal-Distraction-
The-True-Cost-Of-Venture-Capital.aspx.
68. Orcutt, supra note 3, at 881.
69. Id. at 882.
70. Id. at 881.
71. Id. at 877.
72. Id.
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investors do not advertise themselves as such on the Internet very
often.73 The most common way to find angel investors is to ask friends
and family if they would be willing to invest in the startup or if they
know of someone who would be willing to invest in the startup.74
Once the entrepreneur finds individuals or funds willing to invest in
the startup, the entrepreneur needs to ensure that the sale of equity
fits one of the exemptions outlined in § 4 of the 1933 Act.75 To meet
the most important requirements of a § 4(2) private placement ex-
emption, the entrepreneur must have a prior relationship with the in-
vestor and the investor must be sophisticated.76 If no such relationship
exits between the entrepreneur and the investor, the entrepreneur can
seek an exemption under Rules 504, 505, or 506 of Regulation D.77
Naturally, the entrepreneur should hire a securities attorney to ensure
that the requirements for such exemptions are met.
C. A Brief History of Crowdfunding
The phenomenon of crowdfunding originated from the idea of
crowd sourcing, which is “the idea that a [single] task may be dele-
gated to a crowd.”78 Just as a crowd of people could perform a task, a
crowd of people can fund a project. Michael Sullivan coined the term
“crowdfunding” in 2006, even though the phenomenon had existed
since the early 1990s.79 Crowdfunding began with charitable giving,
and then was adapted for use of funding artistic projects of musicians
and filmmakers.80 Artistic projects would create a webpage on a do-
main known as a portal where supporters of the project could donate
or pledge money. Crowdfunding became prominent and gained media
attention in the last few years when websites such as Kickstarter.com
and RocketHub.com began marketing crowdfunding as the premier
method of raising capital.81
73. Geoff Williams, Find Investors for Your Business: Need Some More Operating
Cash? It’s Time to Look for an Investor, ENTRENEUR.COM (Oct. 18, 2006), http://
www.entrepreneur.com/article/169324.
74. Id.
75. See generally 1933 Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012). The SEC has exempted
certain transactions such as the purely intrastate transaction, the purely private trans-
action that meets the SEC v. Purina Ralston Co. requirements, and transactions under
Regulation D. See infra note 76.
76. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
77. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504–230.506 (2013). Regulation D excepts limited offerings in
three situations: (§ 504) where the maximum aggregate offering price is $1,000,000,
(§ 505) where the maximum aggregate offering price is $5,000,000 with no more than
thirty-five purchasers, and (§ 506) where there is no maximum aggregate offering
price but with only thirty-five non-Ralston accredited purchasers and no limit to the
number of Ralston accredited purchasers.
78. Edan Burkett, A Crowdfunding Exemption? Online Investment Crowdfunding
and U.S. Securities Regulation, 13 TRANSACTIONS 63, 63 (2011).
79. Id. at 70–71.
80. Id. at 71.
81. Id.
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III. IS CROWDFUNDING A SECURITY?
The 1933 Act and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder
apply to securities.82 The 1933 Act does not provide a definition of the
word security. However, the 1933 Act gives examples of securities that
fall within the 1933 Act’s scope. The 1933 Act lists notes, stocks and
bonds, profit sharing agreements, investment contracts, and instru-
ments known as securities.83 If equity crowdfunding creates one of
these examples listed above, then the federal securities laws, rules,
and regulations will apply to equity crowdfunding.
The most common test to determine whether crowdfunding falls
within the scope of the federal securities laws, rules, and regulations is
by an application of the test created by the United States Supreme
Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. relating to investment contracts.84
In Howey, defendant sold parcels of citrus groves in Florida to eq-
uity investors.85 Investors took no part in the cultivation and signed
ten-year service agreements where Howey would cultivate and har-
vest the oranges and then pay investors according to the yield of the
oranges.86 The SEC sued Howey claiming that the service agreements
acted as investment agreements and that Howey needed to register
the investments under the 1933 Act.87 The Court agreed with the SEC
and stated that the 1933 and 1934 Acts apply when “the scheme in-
volves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to
come solely from the efforts of others.”88
A. Application of the Howey Test
1. Investment of Money
Money can be invested either in the form of cash, or equivalents,
such as negotiable instruments or chattel paper. In the case of equity
crowdfunding, the crowd invests cash. However, to qualify as an in-
vestment, the crowd cannot receive or buy a consumable commodity
or service. The current crowdfunding of artistic projects such as films
and documentaries do not fall within the scope of the federal securi-
ties laws because supporters are essentially buying consumable com-
modities or services because the supporters receive the perquisites
listed above. If only an equity interest is exchanged, then the Federal
securities laws, rules, and regulations would apply because the entre-
preneur would be issuing a security. Therefore, if an individual deliv-
82. See generally 1933 Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77a–b (2012).
83. Id.
84. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 293 (1946).
85. Id. at 295.
86. Id. at 296.
87. Id. at 293–94.
88. Id. at 301.
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ers cash to a business via a funding portal on the Internet in exchange
for equity, there has been an investment of money.
2. Common Enterprise
A common enterprise exists when everyone’s money has been
pooled together.89 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in SEC v.
Koscot Interplanetary that a common enterprise exists when there is
either horizontal or vertical commonality.90 Vertical commonality ex-
ists when there is a single investor, and the activities of the promoter
are the controlling factor in the success or failure of the investment.91
Horizontal commonality exists when multiple investors have an inter-
related interest in a common scheme.92 Equity crowdfunding most
likely involves horizontal commonality rather than vertical commonal-
ity. In equity crowdfunding the multiple investors are the crowd, or
the many supporters who fund the startup via an online portal, and
the interrelated interest in a common scheme is the interest of making
a return on an investment in the startup.
3. Expected Profits
The word profit is difficult to define. Neither did the Court in
Howey attempt to define the word profit. However, in Howey, the
investors were not buying oranges.93 Rather, the investors were buy-
ing rights to the proceeds of the oranges less growing and production
costs.94 In an equity crowdfunding situation, the crowd is not buying
the goods or services of the startup.95 When the crowd buys consuma-
ble goods and services, the result is donation crowdfunding.96 Rather,
in an equity crowdfunding situation, the crowd buys rights to the pro-
ceeds less the costs of whatever goods and services the startup
provides.
4. Derived Solely from the Efforts of Others
Profits that come solely from the efforts of others require that the
profits come from the labor of people who are not the investors.97
Koscot Interplanetary stated that the expected profits could come
89. Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril:
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 887 (2011).
90. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 1974).
91. COX ET AL., supra note 58, at 38.
92. Id. at 39.
93. Howey, 328 U.S. at 295.
94. Id.
95. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 89, at 890.
96. Tanya Prive, Crowdfunding: It’s Not Just for Startups, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2013
10:29 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2013/02/06/crowdfunding-its-not-
just-for-startups/.
97. Howey, 328 U.S. at 300.
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predominantly from the efforts of others.98 Just as in Howey where
Howey would perform the labor required to grow and sell citrus fruit
for the enterprise, the startup would predominantly perform the labor
required to provide the goods and services of the startup, and the
crowd or equity owners would be entitled to the residual or profits.
Since equity crowdfunding involves the investment of money into a
common enterprise where the crowd would expect profits solely (or
predominantly) from the efforts of others, equity crowdfunding would
most likely qualify as an investment contract and would be subject to
the federal securities laws, rules, and regulations.
IV. COMPLIANCE WITH THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
Issuers99 of securities must comply with the federal security laws,
rules, and regulations or face civil liability to the SEC, individuals, or
both.100 Since equity crowdfunding most likely involves a security,
startups that engage in equity crowdfunding must comply with federal
securities laws, rules, and regulations. The major requirement of the
1933 Act is Section 5 registration.101 The policy behind registration is
to protect investors by requiring issuers of securities to register with
the SEC.102 By registering with the SEC, issuers disclose enough rele-
vant information to investors to allow investors to make informed de-
cisions on the risk involved and whether to purchase the security from
the issuer.103 This is achieved through a Section 5 (of the 1933 Act)
registration statement.104 Registration statements must meet the re-
quirements of Regulation S-K and must precede an IPO.105 An IPO is
an initial sale of stock of a private company to the public with the
assistance of an underwriter, and neither the transaction nor security
is exempt under the federal securities laws.106
Equity crowdfunding is similar to an IPO. When a startup sells own-
ership interest or stock via an online portal to the public for the first
time, the startup essentially performs an IPO. Equity crowdfunding
may even involve an underwriter.107 The function of an underwriter in
98. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d. 473, 485 (5th Cir. 1974).
99. The 1933 Act defines issuers as “every person who issues or proposes to issue
a security.” SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 52. For purposes of this Article, a startup
that sells securities in an equity crowdfunding situation is an issuer because such star-
tup issues or proposes to issue a security.
100. Warren Motley, Charles Jackson, Jr., & John Bernard, Jr., Federal Regulation
of Investment Companies Since 1940, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1134, 1155 (1950).
101. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 89, at 907.
102. COX ET AL., supra note 58, at 3.
103. Id.
104. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 89, at 907.
105. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2013).
106. COX ET AL., supra note 58, at 115.
107. The 1933 Act defines an underwriter generally as any person who has pur-
chased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with,
the distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation
2014] TRANSFORMATIVE REGULATORY REGIME 573
an IPO is to find investors for the issuer.108 The online portal, such as
kickstarter.com or gofundme.com, does exactly that. Online portals
help the startup find investors in the crowd just as an underwriter
would in an IPO situation. Equity crowdfunding therefore has the ap-
pearance of an IPO that would ordinarily require registration with the
SEC.
What saves crowdfunding from being an IPO is the JOBS Act.109
Title III of the JOBS Act amends § 4 of the 1933 Act and adds an
exemption for equity crowdfunding.110 A security or a security trans-
action is either exempt or not exempt from the securities laws, rules,
and regulations.111 Such classifications are binary.112 The classic exam-
ple of binary code is computer code. Computer code is either a one or
a zero and therefore binary. Securities and securities transactions like
binary code are either exempt or nonexempt.113 Exempt securities and
transactions do not need to register with the SEC whereas non-ex-
empt securities and transactions do need to register with the SEC.114
Title III of the JOBS Act exempts transactions involving the offer
or sale of securities by an issuer provided that: (A) the aggregate
amount sold to all investors does not exceed $1,000,000 in a twelve-
month period; (B) the aggregate amount sold to an investor with a net
worth less than $100,000 is $2,000, and to an investor with a net worth
equal to or more than $100,000 is $10,000; (C) the transaction is con-
ducted through a broker or funding portal; and (D) the issuer com-
plies with § 4A(b).115
If the annual income or net worth of an investor is less $100,000,
then the most that investor can invest is $2,000.116 If the investor’s
annual income or net worth is equal to or more than $100,000, the
most that investor can invest is ten percent of the investor’s annual
income or total net worth, not to exceed an aggregate of $100,000, or
in basic terms, $10,000.117 Equity crowdfunding is geared more to-
wards the investor who would be limited to $2,000.118 Not only is the
in any such undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the direct or indirect
underwriting of any such undertaking. See, e.g., SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 52.
108. COX ET AL., supra note 58, at 116.
109. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-116,
§ 302, 126 Stat. 306 (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr360
6enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr3606enr.pdf.
110. Id.
111. Dennis Stubblefield, (Securities) Sellers Beware, NORTH COUNTY LAWYER,
Dec. 2010, at 8.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 14, 21.
115. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-116,
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purpose of the JOBS Act to allow startups to access capital, but also
to allow average Americans the opportunity to invest.119
The main differences between IPOs and equity crowdfunding are
the maximum aggregate price of the offerings and the maximum ag-
gregate price an investor can spend. When Facebook conducted its
IPO in May 2012, Facebook raised an estimated $16 billion.120 The
JOBS Act, however, limits the amount of money that can be raised by
crowdfunding at $1 million.121
One possible reason why Congress set this arbitrary and non-infla-
tion-adjusted maximum aggregate offering price at $1,000,000 is be-
cause of the potential for fraud.122 Since the JOBS Act exempts equity
crowdfunding from fraud-preventing disclosures, a person could
foreseeably create a startup, organize and create a funding campaign
via an online portal, solicit $1,000,000 from the crowd, and then fraud-
ulently embezzle the money raised through the portal.123
Nevertheless, though the JOBS Act does not exempt equity
crowdfunding from Rule 10b-5, liability under § 10b of the 1934 Ex-
change Act prohibits any person from employing a deceptive scheme
or making a material misstatement in connection with the sale or
purchase of a security.124 In addition, if a startup exceeds the limita-
tions of the JOBS Act exemption, the startup would be subject to
§ 12(a)(1) liability of the 1933 Act.125
V. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE JOBS ACT
A. Potential for Fraud and Lack of Adequate Remedy
Since the JOBS Act exemption limits the aggregate price of securi-
ties that an investor can purchase from a single startup in an equity
crowdfunding situation to either $2,000 or $10,000, the most an inves-
tor can recover from the startup is either $2,000 or $10,000.126 With
119. 158 CONG. REC. H1234-01 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2012) (statement of Rep.
Fincher).
120. Julianne Pepitone, Facebook’s IPO Price: $38 Per Share, CNNMONEY (May
17, 2012, 5:15 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/17/technology/facebook-ipo-final-
price.
121. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-116,
§ 301, 126 Stat. 306 (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
112hr3606enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr3606enr.pdf.
122. Thomas Lee Hazen, Content: Social Networks and the Law: Crowdfunding or
Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored
Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735,
1756 (2012).
123. Id.
124. See SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 52; 1933 Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 77j (2012).
125. See SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 52; 1933 Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 77j.
126. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 651–52 (1986) (The appropriate mea-
sure of damages in a securities fraud situation is recessionary damages. Recessionary
damages retroactively rescind the securities transaction and award the investor the
amount of money that the investor spent in the transaction.).
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such low dollar amounts, a 10b-5 or 12a private action might not make
an aggrieved investor whole.
If an investor’s annual income is more than $100,000, and the inves-
tor is capable of spending $10,000 on a crowdfunding campaign, that
investor theoretically qualifies as a sophisticated Ralston investor and
such transaction would be exempt under § 4(2) of the 1933 Act.127
Nevertheless, if an investor invests $2,000 to $10,000, and the entre-
preneur fraudulently steals that money, the investor has lost only
$2,000 to $10,000.128
Choosing to sue the entrepreneur and the startup resembles an in-
vestment decision because so much involves economics.129 If the costs
of the lawsuit exceed the anticipated recovery, then bringing the law-
suit would be pointless. In California, many of these suits would have
to be tried in either small claims courts, where all claims of $5,000 or
less must be tried, or in limited jurisdiction courts, where all claims of
$15,000 or less must be tried.130 Despite being in small claims courts,
an aggrieved investor would likely still need the assistance of an attor-
ney, because a 10b-5 suit is complicated.131 If the Court can barely tell
when reliance is presumed, how can a small claims court officer tell?
Even though the filing fees for such small claims in California range
from $75 to $175,132 filing fees plus the opportunity cost of time spent
litigating the claim,133 and the cost of hiring a securities attorney to
assist the aggrieved investor would exceed the potential recovery of
$2,000.134
127. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-116,
§ 301, 126 Stat. 306 (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr360
6enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr3606enr.pdf.
128. In the grand scheme of investing in the world of securities, $2,000 to $10,000 is
a drop in the bucket not worth getting out of bed, according to fashion model Linda
Evangelista. See SEARCHQUOTES.COM http://www.searchquotes.com/quotation/I_don
%27t_get_out_of_bed_for_less_than_$10,000_a_day./111490/ (last visited May 16,
2013).
129. Charles R. P. Pouncy, The Rational Rogue: Neoclassical Economic Ideology in
the Regulation of the Financial Professional, 26 VT. L. REV. 263, 272 (2002) (describ-
ing an economic decision).
130. Basic Considerations and Questions, CAL. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS,
http://www.dca.ca.gov/publications/small_claims/basic_info.shtml (last visited May 16,
2013).
131. The aggrieved investor theoretically could be a securities attorney and could
therefore rely on the investor’s own knowledge and experience in trying such a suit
and would avoid the costs of hiring a securities attorney.
132. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
133. John W. Payne, James R. Bettman & Mary Frances Luce, When Time is
Money: Decision Behavior under Opportunity-Cost Time Pressure, 66 ORG. BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 131 (1996). Opportunity cost is the value of the next-
highest valued alternative of using a resource. Id. Commonly, opportunity cost is the
value a person loses by doing one activity instead of another. Id. The opportunity cost
of suing in small claims court is the value lost by spending time suing instead of work-
ing one’s profession. Id.
134. Commonly, claimants’ attorneys are typically commission-based and charge on
average 33% of the award. Alternatively, securities attorneys have been known to
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If the issuer is able to obtain Financial Industry Regulatory Author-
ity (FINRA) jurisdiction and compel arbitration, such suits may be
even less desirable.135 The filing fees for a $2,000 claim in FINRA
arbitration are $75.136 For a $10,000 claim, the filing fee is $325.137 If
the aggrieved investor seeks punitive damages, the filings fees in-
crease as the amount requested increases.138
Alternatively, the crowd could pursue a class action. Class actions
benefit the attorneys handling the case more than the plaintiffs. Class
actions take a long time. Investors would receive less money than by
bringing the claim on the investor’s own behalf, but it is better than
receiving nothing at all.
If an aggrieved investor pursues such actions and wins, the investor
may potentially lose money. Therefore, it is better economically not to
bring such suits. Without a threat of potential lawsuits, faux entrepre-
neurs would be less dissuaded from engaging in crowdfunding fraud.
B. JOBS Act Repeats an Existing Exemption
Congress’s creation of this exemption is curious since the SEC
adopted a similar exemption in the form of Rule 504 of Regulation D
during the early 1980s to expand an issuer’s ability to make private
placements.139 Rule 504 creates an exemption for transactions that
have a maximum aggregate offering price of $1,000,000.140 Addition-
ally, Rule 504 does not have a limit on the number of purchasers, does
not impose affirmative disclosure obligations on the issuer, and re-
stricts the resale of Rule 504 securities.141
The JOBS Act exemption also has a maximum aggregate offering
price of $1,000,000, does not have a limit on the number of purchasers,
does not impose affirmative disclosure obligations, and restricts the
charge an hourly fee ranging from $400 to $800. See, e.g., Guide to Finding Securities
Lawyer, LAWS.COM, http://lawyer.laws.com/securities-lawyer (last visited Nov. 9,
2013).
135. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority is a self-regulatory organization
that regulates securities firms in the United States. All broker-dealers must register
with FINRA and agree to FINRA arbitration. See About FINRA, FINANCIAL INDUS-
TRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited May
16, 2013). See also Dennis Stubblefield, The Nuts and Bolts of Customer Stockbroker
Arbitration, ORANGE CNTY. LAW. MAG., Dec. 2009, at 13.
136. FINRA Arbitration Fees Calculator, FINRA, http://apps.finra.org/ARbitration
Mediation/ArbFeeCalc/1/Default.aspx (select “Customer,” and enter today’s date,
and select “Next”; select “No,” and enter the damages requested, and select “Next”)
(last visited Jan. 9, 2014).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2013).
140. Id.
141. Id.
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resale of securities.142 The JOBS Act appears to be somewhat redun-
dant. The fact that Congress created a new exemption indicates that
existing exemptions were ineffective as to achieving Congress’s goal of
allowing startups easier access to equity financing. If existing exemp-
tions were ineffective, then Congress should have created a new ex-
emption that does not mirror an existing ineffective exemption.
C. $1,000,000 Limitation Is Too Low
The $1,000,000 limitation may not allow startups to raise capital suf-
ficient to finance the startup’s operations. In addition, startups often
have the potential to attract more than $1,000,000 in equity invest-
ment. Game console developer Ouya raised $950,000 in its first eight
hours on kickstarter.com.143 And after the first month, Ouya raised
approximately $8.6 million.144 Ouya’s campaign involved funding in
exchange for consumable goods and services. Imagine how much
more investment Ouya could have raised if it was allowed to offer
securities!
Along the same lines, a startup would likely not choose to limit it-
self to $1,000,000 in equity crowdfunding when there is the option of
crowdfunding in exchange for consumable goods or services. In the
latter situation, the startup would incur costs of providing those goods
and services, but those costs would easily be covered by the
crowdfunding campaign and the startup could raise an unlimited
amount. In the former situation, the startup would have to answer to
as many as 500 owners, if not more,145 as well as worry about fiduciary
duties, dividends, annual stockholder meetings, and so much more.
Further, the startup could seek investors under a Rule 505 or 506 ex-
emption under Regulation D and potentially raise more than
$1,000,000.146
142. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-116,
§ 301, 126 Stat. 306 (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr360
6enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr3606enr.pdf.
143. Emmanuel, supra note 19.
144. OUYA: A New One of a Kind Video Game Console, KICKSTARTER.COM, http://
www.kickstarter.com/projects/ouya/ouya-a-new-kind-of-video-game-console (last vis-
ited May 16, 2013).
145. If an equity crowdfunding campaign reaches the maximum aggregate of
$1,000,000, the fewest number of investors possible is 100 assuming each investor pur-
chased $10,000 worth of securities. If each investor purchased $2,000, then the num-
ber of investors would be 500. Theoretically, a startup issuer could sell securities in an
equity crowdfunding situation and have as many as 1,000,000 investors.
146. 505-exempt transactions are limited to an aggregate offering price of
$5,000,000 and 506-exempt transactions do not have a limit. 17 C.F.R.
§§ 230.504–230.506 (2008).
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D. Increased Cost of Compliance
Others have criticized the JOBS Act as increasing how much money
a startup would have to expend on compliance.147 While hopeful se-
curities lawyers may enjoy the JOBS Act’s demands, aspiring business
people may cringe while thinking about how much the cost of compli-
ance with the JOBS Act would be, because the startup would have to
maintain records of the new investors and make sure that the startup
maintains an exempt status. Nonetheless, entrepreneurs ready to
launch an equity crowdfunding campaign may be willing to pay a se-
curities attorney to ensure compliance if doing so meant being able to
raise a significant amount of money.
VI. POTENTIAL CHANGES TO THE JOBS ACT THAT WOULD
IMPROVE EQUITY CROWDFUNDING WHILE PRESERVING
INVESTOR PROTECTION
Perhaps Congress could reexamine the equity crowdfunding exemp-
tion and ask itself, “What should I do?”148 One option is to either
increase or eliminate the maximum aggregate amount that can be
raised in an equity crowdfunding situation and the amount that an
individual investor can invest. The problem with raising or eliminating
the limit is that doing so exposes investors to greater risk in case of
fraud.149 However, disclosure requirements easily offset the increase
in risk exposure. Congress could do what Congress has been doing
since the 1933 Act and impose disclosure requirements on equity
crowdfunding. By making certain disclosures, investors would be bet-
ter able to analyze the risk involved in purchasing a security and de-
cide for themselves whether to purchase that security.
Further, disclosure requirements would deter the contrepreneur.150
The contrepreneur (or wantrepreneur) would have to exert more ef-
fort in creating not just a fake business entity, but fake financials and
fake disclosures that appeared real enough to persuade a potential
investor that not only is the startup real, but that the investor should
invest in the startup. Such disclosure requirements would increase
costs for the startup, but would be balanced by the benefits provided
to the investor in the form of investor protection.
147. See Emmanuel, supra note 19.
148. When four-time National Basketball Association Most Valuable Player
LeBron James decided to leave his home state of Ohio and the state’s loyal fans to
join a competing team in Miami for greater potential rewards, James achieved a stunt
with his new teammates on live television that offended many of his fans and painted
himself in an unflattering light. Attempting to win back fans lost after the debacle,
James recorded a series of commercials for his sponsor, Nike, in which James walked
about cluelessly and asked foolishly, “What should I do?”
149. See Hazen, supra note 122, at 1762.
150. See Groshoff, supra note 52.
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Another option would be to place third-party liability on the online
portal, but this scenario is unlikely to be a viable option, since the
SEC stated in a no-action letter that online portals are not broker-
dealers.151 Online portals mainly create a place for startups to adver-
tise and process the crowdfunding transactions.152 One of the biggest
roles of an underwriter during an IPO is to set the initial price of the
security.153 In a crowdfunding situation, the market would determine
the price of the security. If portals are not involved in the substance of
the transaction, then it does not make sense to impose liability on
someone who merely acts as an intermediary.
Nevertheless, Congress is not limited by the rules of the SEC. Con-
gress could require online portals to perform due diligence investiga-
tions to ensure that the startup is legitimate. Therefore, if the portal
does not investigate the startup, and fraud occurs, then investors could
sue the portal for not ensuring that the startup was legitimate.154 This
example, too, would likely increase costs on the startup, as the portal
would have to expend more of its resources on a crowdfunding cam-
paign, and the portal would likely pass those costs on to the startup as
a barrier to starting a crowdfunding campaign.
Additionally, Congress could require startups to obtain business in-
surance as a condition precedent to operating a crowdfunding cam-
paign. If the startup then engages in fraud, a third-party insurance
company would indemnify the startup. Again, an insurance require-
ment would place more costs on the startup.
Another option is to require some kind of accreditation or certifica-
tion that the startup is real and has a legitimate purpose and business
operation. Congress has plenary power in deciding what the accredit-
ing or certifying agency could be. A government agency such as the
SEC could investigate and research the startups, or perhaps more effi-
ciently, Congress could delegate that authority to private enterprise.
Even still, if a startup were to be required to obtain certification that
the startup is real, then the startup would incur even more costs for
obtaining such certifications. Nevertheless, investors could be certain
that the startup is legitimate and would have to worry about only the
merits of the transaction.
As a result, each of these alternatives to creating more protections
for investors have a common element, increased costs on the startup.
This idea seems counterintuitive, since the purpose of the JOBS Act is
to make access to capital cheaper and easier for startups. Neverthe-
151. Steve Quinlivan, SEC Says Crowdfunding VC Site Not a Broker Dealer,
DODD-FRANK.COM, http://dodd-frank.com/sec-says-crowdfunding-vc-site-not-a-bro
ker-dealer/?goback=.gde_1039587_member_227132374 (last visited May 16, 2013).
152. Id.
153. COX ET AL., supra note 58, at 125.
154. One could likely frame this type of claim as negligence, in which the portal has
a duty to investigate and could be liable for breaching that duty by not investigating
pursuant to that duty.
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less, the increased costs on the startup could be outweighed by the
opportunity to raise a substantial amount of money.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the SEC still has not implemented nor promulgated rules for
the JOBS Act,155 equity crowdfunding is still subject to § 12 of the
1933 Act liability.156 Even when the SEC does implement rules under
the JOBS Act for equity crowdfunding, an equity crowdfunding cam-
paign would be pointless because of the potential failures of the JOBS
Act. Congress’s purpose of the JOBS Act was to make equity
crowdfunding legal, which Congress made happen, but Congress did
not quite realize its purpose.157
Traditional IPOs appear to be dying a long, slow death for several
reasons.158 One cause of this decline is the high cost of IPOs.159 Not
only must a business comply with the 1933 Act with detailed precision
to perform an IPO, that business must hire underwriters to execute
the transaction. The cost of going public averages around ten percent
of the gross proceeds.160 Kickstarter.com, however, charges a flat 5%
if the project is funded.161 A 5% difference that involves millions of
dollars may represent material amounts to investors, web portals, and
companies seeking financing. Not only is crowdfunding cheaper to the
startup, it takes less time than a traditional IPO.162
Equity crowdfunding is essentially a small scale IPO. Because IPOs
will inevitably cease to exist, something must take the place of the
IPO as a means of issuing securities to the public. This Article pro-
poses that equity crowdfunding fill that gap. Through equity
crowdfunding, businesses—whether small startups or private compa-
nies ready to make the plunge into the public—would be able to raise
as much capital as necessary, and investors would be able purchase as
many shares as the public wants. Congress passed, and President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed, the 1933 Act in an era where offers
to purchase or sell a security were done in person, by telephone, or
through U.S. mail. In the last eighty years, the landscape of the world
has changed materially and has brought with it a change in the land-
scape of equity securities.
As evidenced throughout this Article, the new world of raising eq-
uity capital via web platforms no longer needs traditional underwrit-
155. See Quinlivan, supra note 151.
156. See 1933 Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. 77l(a) (2012).
157. Emmanuel, supra note 19.
158. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 89, at 907.
159. Dale A. Oesterle, The High Cost of IPOs Depresses Venture Capital in the
United States, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 369, 370 (2007).
160. Id. at 372.
161. KICKSTARTER.COM, http://www.kickstarter.com/start (last visited Dec. 16,
2013).
162. See generally COX ET AL., supra note 58, at 158–82.
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ers. Instead, investors and businesses can access materially more
relevant information via the Internet today than was available to insti-
tutional investors only fifteen years ago. When Facebook announced
its per share price of $38 for its IPO, many pundits stated that that
price was too high and predicted that the price would drop after initial
sales.163
These prognosticators were able to make such informed predictions
due to the wealth of information available on the Internet. Investors
can rely on the market and available information when deciding
whether to purchase a security. Once the investing world realizes that
the investing world can rely on the market and the wealth of informa-
tion available on the Internet, the investing world will stop employing
the large investment banks. Because crowdfunding portals could per-
form essentially the same function as underwriters for less money,
they may well take the underwriters’ jobs, thanks to the JOBS Act.
Because online portal funding sites may someday replace investment
banks as the intermediary between issuers and investors due to equity
crowdfunding, Morgan Stanley employees may have to someday de-
clare, as once heralded in an episode of the Comedy Central net-
work’s cartoon show, South Park, “Crowdfunding took our jerbs!”164
163. Pepitone, supra note 120; Robert Leclerc, Overvaluing Facebook, FINANCIAL
POST (June 6, 2012, 9:05 PM), http://opinion.financialpost.com/2012/06/06/overvalu-
ing-facebook/.
164. The phrase, “They took our jerbs” eminates from a comedic television pro-
gram in which various characters lost their jobs to individuals who were willing to do
the same work for less money. See Southpark: Goobacks (Comedy Central television
broadcast Apr. 28, 2004). For information on how crowdfunding could potentially af-
fect venture capitalists, see How Crowdfund Investing Will Impact the Venture Capital
and Broker Dealer Community, RESEARCHANDMARKETS (Aug. 2013) (webinar),
available at http://www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/2500780/.
